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This paper analyses ownership structure and company performance in the light 
of corporate governance theory and the actual privatisation process. Previous 
research has proven that the Slovenian state is a poor and passive owner, whereas 
private owners and employees are more active and more interested in their 
company’s economic performance. This paper shows that the transition to private 
ownership in the Slovenian hotel sector has not been finished. Consequently, 
state-owned and investment funds remain important owners of Slovenian hotels. 
The financial performance of hotel companies is below average in the economy 
and can be correlated with the current ownership structure. Since the current 
ownership structure has a negative impact on the hotel sector competitiveness, 
an ownership change is needed to boost the sector’s competitiveness and the 
competitiveness of Slovenia as a tourist destination. 
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1 Introduction
The Slovenian corporate governance system has been highly influenced by the 
privatisation process that took place at the beginning of the 1990s. An important 
characteristic of Slovenian privatisation process has been a high interference of 
artificially created state-owned and investment funds (Simoneti et al., 2003). 
During privatisation 40 percent of companies’ shares were distributed through a 
free transfer to quasi-state and state-owned funds (Development, Restitution and 
Pension funds). The remaining 60 percent were privatised to insiders (internal 
privatisation) or outsiders (external privatisation). Better performing companies 
were privatised internally, while poorly performing companies ended up in the 
hands of state-owned and investment funds. 
Slovenian hotels were performing poorly at the start of the 1990s. Besides poor 
performance, the main characteristics of Slovenian hotel governance were the 
following: a relatively high concentration of ownership, low ownership share of 
foreign owners, high ownership and decision-making power in the hands of state-
owned and investment funds and relatively low ownership shares in the hands 
of insiders (employees and managers). Therefore, the questions investigated in 
this article are: does the ownership structure in Slovenian hotels differ from 
the ownership structure seen in other Slovenian companies? Are owners in the 
Slovenian hotel industry passive and optimising portfolios with their ‘safe’ 
investments in hotels?1 Is the poor ownership structure of Slovenian hotels the 
reason for their current below-average financial and economic performance? 
The corporate governance and ownership structure in the Slovenian hotel 
industry has not been investigated so far. This paper highlights the ownership 
structure and performance of Slovenian hotel companies. It is structured as 
follows. The introduction is followed by a description of corporate governance, 
with systems and ownership structure comprising an important corporate 
governance mechanism. Slovenian corporate governance characteristics are 
described in the third part followed by the characteristics of Slovenian hotel 
industry. The fifth part brings hypotheses, data description and methodology 
1 Hotel investments are seen as being safe due to investment made in real estate.
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followed by a presentation of results. A discussion and conclusions are set out 
in the seventh part. 
2      Definition of Corporate Governance  
        – Its Systems and Mechanisms 
The problem of corporate governance was introduced by Berle and Means (1932). 
Corporate governance has traditionally been associated with the ‘principal-agent’ 
or ‘agency problem’. The principal-agent relationship arises when the owner of 
a company is not the same person as its manager. This ‘separation’ results in 
the following: business failures, takeovers, managers expropriating their rights 
by paying themselves enormous salaries, investors only concerned with short-
term objectives, etc. In order to explain these phenomena, a theoretical and 
empirical framework has been established. Since then, corporate governance 
has remained a subject of extensive research and controversy, resulting in its 
numerous definitions. 
Maher and Anderson (1999) claim that corporate governance is one of the key 
factors for improving microeconomic efficiency. On the other hand, it affects 
the development and functioning of capital markets and has a strong influence 
on resource allocation. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance 
from the investor’s viewpoint as the ways in which suppliers finance corporations 
and ensure they will get a return on their investments. The Cadbury Committee 
(1992) defines corporate governance as a system by which companies are directed 
and controlled. The OECD (2004) defines it as a set of relations among a firm’s 
management, its board, shareholders and stakeholders, which is one of the key 
elements that improves a company’s performance, the fluctuation of capital 
markets, stimulating the innovative activity and development of enterprises. The 
CEPS (1995) defines corporate governance more broadly as the whole system 
of rights, processes and controls established internally and externally over the 
management of a business entity with the objective of protecting the interests 
of all stakeholders.  
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In order to overcome problems in corporate governance, different mechanisms 
can be applied. Denis and McConnell (2003) distinguish corporate governance 
mechanism types as being either internal or external. Internal mechanisms 
operate through the Board of Directors and ownership structure, while external 
mechanisms refer to the external market for corporate control (the takeover 
market) and the legal system. Becht et al. (2000) identify five alternative 
mechanisms of corporate governance: the concentration and identity of owners, 
hostile takeovers and proxy voting, the delegation and concentration of control 
in the Board of Directors, the alignment of managerial interests with investors 
through executive compensation contracts and the clearly defined fiduciary duty 
of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) propose 
seven corporate governance mechanisms: insider shareholdings, institutional 
shareholdings, shareholding by blockholders, a proportion of outsiders on the 
Board of Directors, debt financing, an external labour market for managers and 
a market of corporate control.
All authors describe ownership structure as an important corporate governance 
mechanism. Different owner groups act as more or less active owners and can 
reduce or increase agency costs. Many studies question the difference between 
outsider and insider ownership, state and private ownership, domestic and foreign 
ownership, etc. and its influence on company performance. Research results 
point to different conclusions. Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Friedman et al. 
(2000) show that poor company performance is related to state ownership, while 
Andreson et al. (1999) prove different. Denis et al. (1997), Djankov and Murrell 
(2002), Lausten (2002) and Renneboog (2002) find outsiders more active owners 
than insiders, while Jensen (1993) and De Angelo and De Angelo (1985) claim 
the opposite. The majority of studies, however, find a significant relationship 
between ownership structure and company performance among privatised 
companies and the companies undergoing  privatisation. Unfortunately, we have 
not recorded any empirical evidence exploring the relation between ownership 
structure and company performance in the hotel or tourism industry. 
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3 The Corporate Governance System in Slovenia
Privatisation sets the context for shaping the corporate governance system 
in Slovenia. Approximately 90 percent of Slovenian companies have chosen 
internal distribution and internal buy-out as a privatisation method (Gregorič, 
2003). Internal privatisation was such a ‘popular’ method in Slovenia since 
companies opposed the artificially created owners, such as investment and state-
owned funds and strategic outside owners (Ribnikar, 2000). Artificially created 
state-owned and investment funds were planned to be the ‘initial owners’ that 
would sell their ownership shares to private owners in the so-called secondary 
privatisation (Simoneti et al., 2003). In the given circumstances, state-owned and 
investment funds appeared to be good temporary owners and it was proven that 
the companies sold by the funds to private owners performed better (Simoneti 
et al., 2003). However, state-owned and investment funds were not planned to 
be long-term owners. 
Furthermore, privatisation resulted in the introduction of a two-tier system 
of governance. Most privatised companies opted for the form of a joint-
stock company and introduced the Supervisory Board as a monitoring body 
(Prašnikar and Gregorič, 2002). The main roles of the Supervisory Board are: to 
hire and fire managers, shape the compensation package for managers, monitor 
management actions and company performance. The principal characteristics 
and outcomes of Slovenian privatisation are presented in Figure 1.
The main characteristics of the Slovenian corporate governance model after 
the privatisation process were: a relatively low concentration of ownership (the 
largest shareholder controls 35 percent of ownership shares); an increasing 
number of ownership shares in the hands of non-financial domestic companies 
and managers; decrease in employee ownership; a gradual sell-off of ownership 
controlled by state-owned funds and a low level of interference of foreign non-
financial companies (Gregorič, 2003; Knežević Cvelbar, 2006). A change in the 
ownership structure of Slovenian companies in the 1996-98 and 1998-02 period 
is presented in Appendix (Figure A1 and Table A1).
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Figure 1  Characteristics of Slovenian Privatisation
Source: Authors. 
Several researches have explored the relationship between ownership structure 
and company performance in Slovenia (Gregorič, 2003; Prašnikar and Gregorič, 
2002; Simoneti et al., 2003; Pahor et al., 2004; Domadenik et al., 2006; Knežević 
Cvelbar, 2006; Knežević Cvelbar et al., 2007). Knežević Cvelbar et al. (2007) 
find that companies with a higher direct state ownership performed poorer 
than the other companies. Pahor et al. (2003) report that state-owned and 
investment funds are poor owners and their transformation is highly important 
for achieving a normal market-oriented economy with a reduced political 
influence on business. Domadenik (2003) shares their opinion. Furthermore, 
Gregorič (2003) and Simoneti et al. (2003) find foreign and domestic companies 
as more active owners, while Prašnikar and Gregorič (2002) claim that insiders 
(employees and managers) are more efficient owners than state-owned funds. To 
summarise, research results prove that the state (direct and indirect ownership 
– state-owned funds) is a poor and passive owner, while domestic and foreign 
companies and insiders (employees and managers) appear to be more active 
and more performance-oriented owners (Prašnikar and Gregorič, 2002; Knežević 
Cvelbar, 2006). 
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4 The Slovenian Hotel Industry  
After 1990, when Slovenia gained its independence, the number of international 
and domestic tourist arrivals plummeted. The situation stabilised in 1995. In 
the last ten years, further growth trends have been observed, with the record 
of 2,482,189 tourists in 2006. In the same year, 7,717,022 overnight stays were 
realised and tourism receipts totalled EUR 1,486 million. Approximately 60 
percent of international tourist arrivals included Italian, Austrian, German, 
Croatian and tourists from the United Kingdom (SORS, 2007). 
Important elements of a destination’s competitiveness are the attributes of 
tourist supply, such as accommodation capacities. Accommodation capacities in 
Slovenia have not increased significantly in the last 15 years. On the other side, 
the quality of accommodation has improved significantly (Ivankovič, 2004). 
In 2004, more than 60 percent of accommodation capacities in Slovenia were 
found in hotels (in 1990 the figure was 40 percent). More than 50 percent of 
hotel capacities are at the four-star level and approximately 40 percent at the 
three-star level (Kavčič et al., 2005). The average bed occupancy rate in 1989 was 
47.1 percent, in 1998 38.1 percent and 43.6 percent in 2004 (Ivankovič, 2004; 
Kavčič et al., 2005). The average bed occupancy rate is considerably below the 
EU average (66 percent). However, a growing trend has been observed in last 
few years.   
The financial and economic performance of Slovenian hotel companies is 
analysed by Mihalič and Dmitrović (2000), Omerzelj Gomezelj and Mihalič 
(2007) and Kavčič et al. (2005). Mihalič and Dmitrović (2000) show that 
Slovenian hotel companies performed worse than other Slovenian companies 
in economic and financial terms. This is even poorer when compared to the 
international hotel companies. This poor financial performance is characterised 
by significantly lower return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and profit 
margin values (Table 1). 
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Table 1  Comparison of the Slovenian and International Hotel Company 
            Performance
ROA (average for 
period 2002-04)
ROE (average for 
period 2002-04)
Profit margin (average 
for period 2002-04)
Slovenian hotels 0.28   0.41    1.37
Accor 3.02   9.01   8.61
Hilton 2.42   8.12 18.94
Intercontinental 4.61 10.48 13.85
Source: Kavčič et al. (2005). 
The poor economic performance was also reflected in the losses incurred by the 
majority of Slovenian hotels. Kavčič et al. (2005) believe that cost ineffectiveness 
is the main reason for the poor economic and financial performance of Slovenian 
hotels. Furthermore, they claim that the current corporate strategies would lead 
Slovenian hotel companies into bankruptcy.  
5 Data and Methodology 
The main hypotheses tested in this article refer to the ownership structure and 
performance of Slovenian companies operating in the hotel industry and its 
comparison with other Slovenian companies:
Hypothesis 1: the average ownership shares of state-owned funds are • 
higher in hotel companies compared to other companies in the Slovenian 
economy;
Hypothesis 2: employees have lower ownership shares in Slovenian hotel • 
companies than in other companies in the Slovenian economy;
Hypothesis 3: ownership structure is related to company performance, • 
meaning that Slovenian hotel companies are performing economically 
and financially worse than other companies in the Slovenian economy.
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To test the above hypotheses, we used primary and secondary data sources. The 
primary data were collected within a quantitative research performed by the Institute 
for South-East Europe (ISEE). The research took place in the May-September 
2003 period. A total of 623 questionnaires was mailed to  Slovenian companies 
and 211 were returned. The main database was structured as an unbalanced 
panel dataset. The data on the corporate governance system in the questionnaire 
refer to a seven-year period (from 1997 to 2003). Secondary data sources were 
used in order to obtain financial data. Financial reports were available from the 
Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services. 
Most companies (81 percent) in the sample are registered as joint-stock 
companies. The companies in the sample represented 19.5 percent of the sales 
and assets of all Slovenian companies with 20.1 percent of all employees in 
2003. The average number of employees working in the companies in the sample 
varied through the years from 458 to 496. If the companies were classified 
according to the number of employees, the sample comprised 10.7 percent of 
small companies, 75.8 percent of medium-sized companies and 13.5 percent of 
large companies. Financial indicators show that the total company sales growth 
(DTS) increased from 7.2 to 11.5 percent on average at an annual level. The 
ROA in the observed period varied between 9.4 and 11 percent, while the value 
added per employee (VA/E) was EUR 31.4. The companies in the sample had a 
debt-to-asset ratio (D/A) of around 40 percent. In the sample of 211 Slovenian 
companies, there were 10 companies operating in the hotel industry. The average 
number of employees in those companies was 390. There was 28 percent of 
small companies, 56.6 percent of medium-sized companies and 15.1 percent of 
large companies. On average, DTS grew by 7.4 percent at an annual level, the 
average ROA was negative (-0.25 percent) and the average VA/E was EUR 19.8, 
which is lower than the average for other companies in the Slovenian economy. 
On the other hand, the average D/A ratio in Slovenian hotel companies was 50.4 
percent, which is higher than in other Slovenian companies. 
An important limitation of this study refers to the sample size of hotel companies. 
We therefore tested the sample for a selection bias problem. Heckman’s test 
(1979) was used in order to test the correlation of errors between two models. Two 
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Heckman’s tests were performed. The first compared representative companies 
(companies that were privatised by 1998) and companies from the sample. The 
second compared companies operating in the hotel industry in both samples 
(representative and our sample). Both tests showed no correlation in the error 
terms between the groups. Thus, no correction for a selection bias was made 
(Appendix: Tables A2 and A3). 
6 Ownership Structure as a Corporate
        Governance Mechanism in Hotel Companies
In order to compare ownership and performance characteristics between hotels 
and other companies in Slovenia, the sample was divided into two groups. 
With regard to the ownership identity, the following groups of owners were 
recognised: state-owned funds, investment funds, foreign companies, domestic 
companies, employees, managers, banks, minority owners and other owners 
(within the group of other owners, the state was the most important). As can 
be seen in Figure 2, state-owned funds, investment funds and managers have 
higher average ownership shares in hotel companies than in other companies in 
Slovenia. On the contrary, employees, foreign companies and other owners have 
lower average ownership shares in hotel companies compared to other Slovenian 
companies. 
In order to test the differences between the two group means, an independent 
sample t-test was performed, comparing the mean values of ownership shares 
between the groups (Table 2). As can be seen in the case of state-owned and 
investment funds, the ownership t-test for the equality of means2 showed 
that there are statistically significant differences between the group means. It 
is therefore evident that Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected; meaning that state-
owned and investment funds have higher ownership shares in hotel companies 
than in other Slovenian companies.
2 Levene’s test showed that equal variances between the groups are assumed.
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Figure 2  Comparison of Ownership Structure in Hotels and Other Companies 
              in Slovenia
Source: Authors.
Besides state-owned and investment funds, a t-test for the equality of means3 
showed significant differences between the group means for ownership shares held 
by banks, foreign companies and employees. Foreign companies, employees and 
banks have lower ownership shares in the group of hotel companies compared 
to the other Slovenian companies. This means we can confirm that the internal 
privatisation did not take place within hotel companies in Slovenia, which 
confirms Hypothesis 2. It is interesting to note that no foreign company had 
ownership shares in Slovenian hotel companies. The low involvement of foreign 
ownership is one of Slovenia’s corporate governance weaknesses. However, it can 
be claimed that this weakness is even greater among hotel companies. 
3 Levene’s test showed that equal variances between the groups are assumed.
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Table 2  Comparison of Ownership Structure in Hotels and Other Companies
Ownership groups Companies N Mean t Sig. t (2-tailed)
State-owned funds
Hotel 53 17.72 2.232 0.026 b
Others 1097 12.51
Investment funds 
Hotel 53 22.66 2.470 0.017 a
Others 1095 15.08
Banks 
Hotel 52 0.79 -2.907 0.005 a
Others 1093 1.78
Foreign companies 
Hotel 18 0.00 -7.851 0.000 a
Others 481 8.85
Domestic companies
Hotel 18 23.65 0.151 0.880
Others 476 22.49
Employees
Hotel 41 12.88 -5.031 0.000 a
Others 979 22.30
Managers 
Hotel 51 5.78 0.856 0.392
Others 1037 4.11
Minority owners 
Hotel 52 4.23 0.847 0.397
Others 1091 3.06
Others 
Hotel 47 1.05 0.864 0.388
Others 1093 7.76
Note: a  - statistically significant difference at the 1 percent level; b  - statistically significant difference at the 5 
percent level.
Source: Authors.
In order to acquire more evidence to confirm Hypothesis 1, we compared the 
values of ownership shares held by state-owned funds and employees among 
different industries within the sample. ANOVA tests were performed and the 
results showed significant differences between the group means. 
Differences between the average state-owned fund ownership with regard to the 
industry were tested first. The ANOVA test results presented in Table 3 show there 
are statistically significant differences between the group means, indicating that 
companies operating in different industries have different average ownership 
shares controlled by state-owned funds. 
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Table 3  ANOVA Test Results (Comparison of State-Owned Fund 





squares DF Mean square F Sig.
Between 
groups
26177 37 707.505 2.701 .000 a
Within groups 291330 1112 261.988
Total 317508 1149
 Note: a  - statistically significant difference at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors.
Based on the ANOVA test results, the companies were divided into seven groups. 
As presented in Table 4, state-owned funds have the lowest ownership shares 
in transport, wholesale and retail, publishing and printing, manufacturing of 
equipment as well as the food and beverage industry. On the other hand, state-
owned funds have the highest average ownership shares in the hotel, furniture 
and paper, manufacturing of basic metal and farming industry. This evidence 
verifies that state-owned funds have higher ownership shares in the hotel than 
in other Slovenian industries (Table 4). 
Table 4  Comparison of the Average Ownership Shares Held by 
            State-Owned Funds, by Sectors, in %
Group 1  N Mean 
Transport   7   0.00
Group 2
Wholesale and retail 14   3.43
Publishing and printing 35   5.12
Manufacturing of equipment 14   5.88
Manufacturing of food and beverages 70   6.63
Group 7
Hotels 53 17.72
Manufacturing of basic metals 21 18.16
Manufacturing of furniture 14 20.81
Farming 18 21.41
Manufacturing of paper 14 29.37
Source: Authors.
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We further tested the difference between the average ownership shares held by 
employees (Table 5). The ANOVA test results showed statistically significant 
differences among sectors, confirming Hypothesis 2. 
Table 5  ANOVA Test Results (Comparison of Employee Ownership Shares 




squares DF Mean square F Sig.
Between 
groups
66678 37 1802.124 3.610 .000 a
Within groups 490261 982 499.248
Total 556939 1019
Note: a  - statistically significant difference at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors.
Table 6  Comparison of the Average Ownership Shares Held by Employees, 
            by Sectors, in %
Group 1   N Mean 
Health and social work   7  0.00
Group 2
Sale and maintenance  14  0.09
Collection, purification and distribution of water  13  5.84
Other service activities   7  7.16




Manufacturing of other non-mineral products 38 30.33
Manufacture of equipment 11 30.50
Mining   7 30.67
Manufacture of rubber and plastic product  49 31.45
Wholesale and retail         51        31.54
Supporting transport activities         14        34.29
Manufacture of motor vehicles         12        45.33
Group 7
Transport           7        62.66
Source: Authors.
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As in the case of state ownership, the companies were divided into seven groups. 
As expected, hotel companies belong to the group of sectors with the lowest 
ownership shares held by insiders. This is a further confirmation indicating that 
the internal privatisation did not take place among Slovenian hotel companies 
(Table 6). 
After the ownership structure analysis, we examined the differences in company 
performance between hotels and other companies in the Slovenian economy. 
While the measures of financial performance were analysed (ROA, D/A and 
DTS), the measure of economic performance (VA/E) was compared between the 
groups. As can be seen in Figure 3, companies operating in the hotel industry 
performed worse than other companies in the Slovenian economy. 
Figure 3  Comparison of Economic Performance Between Hotels and Other
             Companies in Slovenia
Note: D/A – debt to assets; ROA – return on assets; DTS – total sales growth; VA/E – value added per 
employee.
Source: Authors.
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An independent sample t-test showed there are statistically significant differences 
between the group means4 for the variables ROA, VA/E and D/A, which confirms 
Hypothesis 3. ROA was negative and substantially lower within hotel companies 
(-0.25 percent) compared to other companies in the Slovenian economy (4.42 
percent). Hotel companies have a statistically significant higher level of debt 
compared to other companies in the Slovenian economy (the D/A ratio was 
50.4 percent for hotel companies compared to 40.3 percent for other Slovenian 
companies). VA/E was substantially lower in the group of hotel companies (VA/E 
was approximately 40 percent lower in the group of hotel companies relative 
to other companies in the Slovenian economy). DST was lower in the group 
of hotel companies in relation to other companies in the Slovenian economy. 
However, the difference was statistically insignificant. Based on the above results, 
we can confirm our expectation that hotel companies have worse financial and 
economic performance than other companies in the Slovenian economy.  
Table 7  Comparison of Financial and Economic Performance Between Hotels 
            and Other Companies




Others 1188   40.34%













Note: a  - statistically significant difference at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors. 
In summarising the results, it may be claimed that hotel companies performed 
worse than other companies in Slovenia. This is in line with the findings in 
Kavčič et al. (2005). Following the results of previous studies that correlated 
company performance with the ownership structure (Djankov and Murrell, 
2002; Lausten, 2002; Denis et al., 1997; Prašnikar and Gregorič, 2002; Pahor et 
4 Levene’s test showed that equal variances between the groups are assumed.
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al., 2003; Knežević Cvelbar et al., 2007), we can claim that the poor financial 
and economic performance of hotel companies can be partly explained by their 
ownership structure. 
7 Conclusions 
In the privatisation process of the Slovenian economy hotel companies were less 
attractive to private owners. Thus, they kept a high percentage of state-owned 
fund ownership. This research confirmed that state ownership in the hotel 
sector is significantly higher than in other sectors of the Slovenian economy. 
Consequently, hotels have lower ownership shares controlled by private capital 
and employees than companies in other sectors. Previous studies have also 
shown that state-owned funds have a negative influence on the performance of 
companies in which they hold ownership shares due to their passive investment 
policy and the fact that the state often pursues not only economic but also 
political interests (Knežević Cvelbar et al., 2007). This is in line with our initial 
expectations that Slovenian hotel companies perform below the average of the 
Slovenian economy.  
The current ownership structure reveals that the so-called secondary privatisation 
in the Slovenian hotel sector has not taken place. Nevertheless, the artificially 
created state-owned funds were not planned to be long-term owners; on the 
contrary, they were planned to be sellers in the so-called secondary privatisation 
process that is obviously still underway in the hotel sector. Another evident 
problem in the Slovenian hotel sector is a low level of foreign investment. 
Ownership shares in the hands of foreign owners are lower in the hotel 
sector than in other sectors, which may be explained by the unattractiveness 
of Slovenian hotel companies due to their poor performance and a generally 
unfavourable environment for foreign investment.  
The present corporate governance model, based on the current ownership 
structure of the Slovenian hotel sector cannot be sustained in the long-run. 
Passive owners appoint passive managers, which results in poor economic 
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performance. The Slovenian hotel industry needs ownership change, from 
passive (state-owned and investment funds) to more active owners (domestic and 
foreign companies) in order to introduce new ways of governing, develop new 
strategies and start the internationalisation process. As new models of governing 
management, contracting and licensing would be appropriate. Such a transition 
would initiate a change in management and improve the competitiveness of 
hotel companies which in the long-run would improve the competitiveness of 
Slovenia as a tourist destination.    
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Appendix 
Figure A1  Comparison of Ownership Structures in the 1996-98 and 
               1998-2003 Period
Source: Prašnikar et al. (2000) and Knežević Cvelbar (2006).
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Table A2  The Heckman Test Results (Whole Sample; Selection: 
              Representative Sample)
Heckman selection model
(regression model with sample selection)
Wald Chi2(4)       =     13.01
Number of obs.     =            473
Censored obs.       =              88
Uncensored obs.    =            385
Log likelihood  =  -176.9578
Prob > Chi2      =       0.0112
Coefficient Standard 
Error
z P>z [95% Confindence 
Interval]
roat
own_fund   -4.22e-06 .0002082 0.02 0.984 -.0004039 -.0004124
own_compan~s  .0003904 .0001945 2.01 0.045 b 9.17e-06 .0007716
own_ inter   .0005945 .0002354 2.53 0.012 b .0001332 .0010558
da -.0382144 .019266 -1.98 0.047 b -.075975 -.0004538
_cons   .0218365 .0169844 1.29 0.199 -.0114524 .0551253
select
blts -.5722033 1.381932 0.41 -0.679 -3.280741 2.136334
bda -.2646002 .3902827 -0.68 0.498 -1.02954 .5003398
_cons    1.02633 .1673484 6.13 0.000 .6983334 1.354327
/athrho    .1322787 .2215851 0.60 0.551 -.3020201 .5665775
/lnsigma   -2.607088 .0436621 -59.71 0.000 -2.692664 -2.521511
rho .1315125 .2177527 -.2931602 .5128413
sigma .073749 .00322 .0677004 .0803381
lambda .0096989 .0161841 -.0220214 .0414192
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):   Chi2(1) = 0.20   Prob > Chi2 = 0.6588
Note: b – statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Source: Authors. 
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Table A3  The Heckman Test Results (Hotel Companies Sample; Selection: 
              Hotel Companies Representative Sample)
Heckman selection model
(regression model with sample selection)
Wald Chi2(4)       =     13.01
Number of obs.    =            35
Censored obs.      =              5
Uncensored obs.   =            30
Log likelihood  =  -265.2123
Prob > Chi2      =       0.8948
Coefficient Standard 
Error
z P>z [95% Confindence 
Interval]
dtst
own_fund     -.0002569 .0008219 -0.31 0.755   -.0018679 .0013541
own_compan~s  .0002036 .0007454 0.27 0.785 -.0012573 .0016645
own_ inter   0002749 .0008943 -0.31 0.759 .0020276 .004778
_cons   .1176805 .0830095 1.42 0.156 -.0450151 .2803761
select
blts 7.42e-09 1.87e-08 0.40 0.692 -2.93e-08 4.41e-08
bda .1291621 .3374365 0.38 0.702 -.5322012 .7905254
_cons    .3417968 .1538229 2.22 0.026 .0403094 .6432841
/athrho    -.0269144 .4471447 -0.06 0.952 -.9033019 .8494731
/lnsigma   -1.298383 .0449963 -28.86 0.000 -1.386574 -1.210192
rho -.0269079 .4468209 -.7179018 .6907941
sigma .2729729 .0122828 .2499301 .2981402
lambda -.0073451 .1220172 -.2464945 .2318042
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): Chi2(1) = 0.00   Prob > Chi2 = 0.9611
 
Source: Authors. 
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